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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in its 
summary judgment ruling in finding that the insurance policy in question was 
canceled and therefore unavailable upon which to base any liability of Appellee. 
Appellants' statement of the issues in their brief differs from those stated 
in their docketing statement. In their docketing statement, Appellants claimed 
issues on appeal that were not raised at the trial court level, which prompted 
Appellee to file a motion for summary disposition. Appellants have since 
changed their statement of the issues to that presented in their brief. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented by this case presents questions of law as regards 
both the cancellation of the insurance policy and the liability of Appellee under 
the insurance policy. The trial court, in reviewing all relevant facts concerning the 
transactions between the parties to this case, ruled that the insurance policy in 
question was canceled and therefore not available to cover any losses incurred 
by Appellants, which was a factual finding. Since Appellants could not then 
maintain a cause of action against Appellee for failure to make a claim against 
that insurance policy, the trial court ruled that Appellee was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
On an appeal from the granting of a summary judgment motion, the 
appellate court is to "consider the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the losing party below, and as to all legal questions,... 
'[to] review the trial court's conclusions for correctness, granting them no 
deference/" Workman v. Brighton Properties.lnc.. 976 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Utah 
1 
App. 1999) (citations omitted); 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 
1994); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions that would be determinative of this 
case. Statutes that might provide insight into the issues at hand would be Utah 
Code Annotated §57-1-19 through §57-1-44 regarding trust deeds. General 
contract principles would also apply. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves a civil dispute over the existence and application of a 
forced place insurance policy obtained by Appellee, Lee Servicing Company 
("Lee Servicing") to protect its interest in a trust deed entered into by Appellants, 
Ms. Munford and Mr. Badger (the "Borrowers"). 
Borrowers filed this lawsuit on May 27, 1997, claiming that Lee Servicing 
had failed and refused to make a claim against a forced place fire insurance 
policy for damages suffered by Borrowers above and beyond that covered by 
their own private fire insurance. Record at 1-7. Lee Servicing obtained this 
policy upon Borrowers' breach of their obligation to maintain such insurance on 
the real property that was the security for a trust deed and note held by Lee 
Servicing. Record at 64-66, 43, 196, 208, 212-16. Borrowers sought either a 
declaration that the policy was an excess coverage policy and Lee Servicing was 
required to make a claim against it or that an award of damages should be 
entered against Lee Servicing based on that failure to make a claim. The 
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damages sought were in an unspecified amount to be in the form of an offset on 
their loan. Record at 2. 
Lee Servicing answered and counterclaimed against Borrowers on 
October 31, 1997, which counterclaim is not before this Court. Record at 12-18. 
Borrowers answered the counterclaim on November 17,1997. Record at 19-20. 
Borrowers filed a motion for partial summary judgment on June 25,1998, 
seeking to have a determination on liability, with the issue of damages to be 
reserved for trial. Record at 40-41. Lee Servicing filed an objection to 
Borrowers' motion for partial summary judgment and a countermotion for 
summary judgment on the issue of liability on July 10, 1998. Record at 190-91, 
188-89. A hearing was held on December 15, 1998 with the honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding. Record at 362. After oral arguments on the competing 
motions, the trial court granted Lee Servicing's motion for summary judgment 
based on the trial court's evidentiary finding that the forced place insurance 
policy had been canceled and was therefore not available upon which to make a 
claim. The trial court further found that Borrowers' motion for partial summary 
judgment was not well taken. Record at 364. The Order reflecting those findings 
was filed on February 9, 1999. Record at 367-70. Borrowers' Notice of Appeal 
was filed on March 1, 1999. Record at 371-72. 
Appellants filed their docketing statement on March 26, 1999, in which 
they stated that the issues raised in this appeal were 1) whether Appellee led 
Appellants to believe that there was a policy of excess coverage fire insurance in 
favor of Appellants to cover their losses to the property due to fire damage; and 
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2) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee 
on the issue of whether a contractual relationship existed between the parties. 
Appellee filed a motion for summary disposition on April 13, 1999 on the grounds 
that neither of these issues were presented to the trial court for resolution, either 
in the pleadings or at oral argument on the motions for summary judgment, and 
therefore could not be raised for the first time on appeal. A Notice to Submit for 
Decision was filed on April 30,1999 and this Court denied the motion for 
summary disposition and deferred the issues raised by the summary disposition 
motion until briefing of the case. Since Appellants have modified their statement 
of the issues, those arguments will not be revisited in this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Antenette Munford and Jon Badger ("Borrowers") were the owners 
of real property (the "Property") located at 2793 South 3095 West, Salt Lake City, 
84119. Record 2, 42,43, 46. 
2. On or about November 22, 1993, Borrowers executed a Trust Deed 
and Note in the principal amount of $32,983.00 in favor of Zions First National 
Bank, as beneficiary, secured by an first position lien interest in the Property (the 
"Zions' Lien"). Record 43, 57-63. 
3. On or about October 20, 1995, Borrowers executed a Trust Deed 
and Note in the principal amount of $31,401 in favor of AIM Mortgage, Inc., as 
beneficiary, secured by a second position lien interest in the Property, which was 
subsequently assigned to Alliance Funding Corporation ("Alliance") (the "Alliance 
Lien"). Record 13, 43, 64-72, 73, 194, 208. 
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4. Lee Servicing is the servicer for Alliance. Record 43, 73, 208. 
5. Borrowers were required by the terms of the Trust Deed to maintain 
fire insurance on the property with Alliance listed as the beneficiary in order to 
protect Alliance's security interest in the Property, or to reimburse Alliance for 
any expenses incurred by it taken to protect its interest in the event of a default of 
this obligation. Record 64, 66. 
6. Borrowers had fire insurance through Farmer's Home Group 
("Farmer's"), which was canceled on October 15,1996. Record 43, 196, 208, 
212,214-16. 
7. Upon discovery of the cancellation, Alliance, through Lee Servicing, 
notified Borrowers of their obligation to obtain new fire insurance to discharge 
their obligation to protect the security for the loan, i.e. the Property. Record 4, 
131,208,267. 
8. Lee Servicing did not receive notification of any new policy obtained 
by Borrowers prior to December 20, 1996 and, therefore, ordered forced place 
fire insurance coverage through Cigna Property and Casualty (the "Cigna Policy") 
to cover the amount of its interest in the Property, with Alliance named as the 
i 
primary beneficiary, and paid the $157 premium. Record 196, 208. 
9. Sometime in September, 1996, Borrowers applied for and obtained 
a new fire insurance policy to cover the Property and discharge their obligation to 
maintain fire insurance as required by the Trust Deed. This policy was through 
Phoenix Indemnity and was an actual cash value policy and was made 
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retroactively effective as of the date of the cancellation of the Farmer's Policy. 
Record 138, 196, 208, 210, 212, 214, 268-69, 272-274. 
10. On December 14, 1996, a fire occurred on the Property. Record 
196. 
11. Borrowers received the benefits of the Phoenix Indemnity policy to 
rebuild the structure, which was under the actual cash value of the policy, not 
replacement value, so depreciation was a factor. Borrowers received $52,000 in 
rebuilding costs (instead of $58,000 claimed as the full cost of replacement), 
plus an additional $40,000 in contents coverage. Record 143, 144, 158, 171, 
195,210. 
12. Upon notification of the existence of the Phoenix Indemnity Policy, 
Lee Servicing requested and received a full refund of the premium paid on the 
Cigna Policy FIF000136. Record 197, 142. 
13. On January 13,1997, Borrowers tendered the reimbursement of 
the premium to Lee Servicing through their counsel, which Lee Servicing applied 
towards delinquent amounts due and owing on the underlying obligation. Record 
5-6, 133-34, 195,208. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals should affirm the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment on the grounds that, even viewing all of the undisputed facts 
in a light most favorable to Borrowers, Lee Servicing is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
6 
Borrowers were required by the Trust Deed and Note into which they 
entered to maintain fire insurance on the property as a protection to Lee 
Servicing against any loss that might occur to the security given for the loan. 
Borrowers failed to do so, requiring Lee Servicing to take steps to protect its own 
interests by obtaining its own insurance policy. Once Borrowers had complied 
with their obligations and obtained replacement coverage that was retroactively 
effective as of the date of the previous cancellation, there was, in essence, no 
lapse of coverage and, therefore, no default of the Alliance Trust Deed to allow 
Lee Servicing to obtain forced place insurance. The premium paid by Lee 
Servicing was refunded in full by Cigna and the policy was void as of its 
inception. There was, therefore, no policy upon which to make a claim for any 
difference between the actual cash value of the Phoenix Indemnity policy 
obtained by Borrowers and the replacement cost of rebuilding the structure that 
was damaged by the fire. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court's finding that the Cigna Policy had been 
canceled should be affirmed because it is clearly supported by 
the undisputed facts and the basic principles of contract law.. 
The trial court concluded that the Cigna Policy had been canceled based 
upon the proffered factual evidence introduced at the hearing regarding the 
details of the transactions between the parties and the nature of forced place 
insurance in the context of a mortgage or trust deed. This ruling formed the 
basis for the trial court's ruling on the summary judgment issue of liability and 
7 
precluded the trial court from reaching the issue of whether the Cigna Policy was 
a policy for excess coverage. 
Borrowers have mischaracterized the issues presented by this case. 
Borrowers have claimed that the issues are whether the Cigna Policy was one of 
"excess coverage" and whether Lee Servicing is liable to Borrowers for failing to 
make a claim on it. The trial court, in its finding in favor of Lee Servicing, did not 
reach the issue of the "excess coverage" claim advanced by Borrowers. Instead, 
the trial court found that the Cigna Policy was canceled on the basis of the 
undisputed facts, as set forth above, and on the understanding that forced place 
insurance is at its core a penalty for the default of obligations under the trust 
deed that could significantly impair the secured party's rights in the property and 
is intended for the protection of the secured party, not necessarily the borrower. 
In support of the trial court's ruling that the Cigna Policy had been 
canceled, there were sufficient facts undisputed by either party upon which the 
trial court could find that the Cigna Policy had been canceled. Borrowers had an 
obligation to maintain fire insurance on the property for the protection of Lee 
Servicing, which they failed to do. Borrowers were notified of the default and of 
Lee Servicing's intention to obtain forced place coverage if this default was not 
remedied. Borrowers were also notified that this forced place insurance policy 
was for the protection and benefit of Alliance, not Borrowers. Borrowers 
obtained replacement coverage retroactively effective from the date of the 
previous cancellation, which in essence cured the default under the Alliance 
Trust Deed. Borrowers further claim in their brief that they notified Lee Servicing 
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of the new policy with Phoenix Indemnity prior to the date of the fire, which even 
viewed in the light most favorable to Borrowers, supports the trial court's ruling 
that the Cigna Policy was canceled. Borrowers did not reimburse Lee Servicing 
for the premium it had laid out for the Cigna Policy until after the loss had 
occurred, despite the fact that they had complied with the requirement that they 
cure the lapse in coverage and notified Lee Servicing of said compliance. 
Further, the premium for the Cigna Policy was refunded to Lee Servicing in full, 
evidencing the understanding that the Cigna Policy was canceled as of the date 
of its inception since no amount of the premium was retained by Cigna to 
compensate for any coverage provided to Lee Servicing. 
Based upon these facts, the trial court concluded that the insurance policy 
had been canceled. Consequently, there could be no liability on the part of Lee 
Servicing for failure to make a claim upon the policy. This ruling made 
Borrowers' contention as to the type of coverage provided by the Cigna Policy 
moot. 
Borrowers have alleged that the Cigna Policy was not canceled until the 
date that the refund of the premium advanced by Lee Servicing was issued. This 
allegation does not comport with the basic terms of insurance law. If the 
insurance policy had not been canceled until the date the refund was issued, the 
policy would have been in effect for several months, thus entitling the insurance 
carrier to retain a portion of the premium in payment for services provided. Cigna 
did not retain any of the premium, demonstrating that the policy was canceled as 
of the date of its inception. 
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II. Even when all relevant facts and the inferences drawn from 
tham are viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, 
Appellee is still entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine dispute 
as to material issues and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the trial court 
reviewed the undisputed facts, as set forth above, and found that, even with the 
facts viewed in a light most favorable to Borrowers, the law required a finding of 
judgment for Lee Servicing. The trial court found that the forced place insurance 
policy was canceled in light of the facts concerning the particulars of the 
transactions between the parties and that, since there was no policy, there could 
have been no claim made against it. 
Borrowers do not dispute that the Farmer's Policy was cancelled nor that 
they were required to maintain insurance upon the property to protect the interest 
of both lienholders. They do not dispute that they obtained replacement 
coverage with Phoenix Indemnity that technically erased their default under the 
terms of the Alliance Trust Deed. Even if Borrowers had reimbursed Lee 
Servicing for the Cigna Policy premium before the date of the fire, the policy 
would not have been able to be maintained due to their correction of the event 
that allowed Lee Servicing to procure the policy. 
It is well established in contract law that the terms of the contract govern 
the actions to be taken by the parties, both in terms of affirmative and prohibited 
actions. See Cherry v. Utah State University, 966 P.2d 866, 869-70 (Utah App. 
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1998)("in interpreting a contract, we first look to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intent of the parties."); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. v. Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); see also Ryan v. 
Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998)('the law enables parties 
to freely contract, establishing terms and allocating risks between them"). 
In this case, the terms of the Alliance Trust Deed provides that Appellants 
would affirmatively act to protect the property given as security for their debt to 
Alliance from loss and that failure to do so would result in the penalty of having to 
reimburse Alliance for the cost of any step it was required by such failure to take. 
It therefore follows that if there is no default under the trust deed, there can be no 
penalty inflicted for default. 
The Alliance Trust Deed required that Borrowers maintain 
insurance on the property and that, if they failed to do so, they would be 
responsible for the costs incurred by Lee Servicing in being forced to take 
measures to protect its interest in the property. When Borrowers obtained the 
Phoenix Indemnity Policy as retroactive coverage from the date of the 
cancellation of the Farmer's Policy, it acted to negate the default that forced Lee 
Servicing to obtain the Cigna Policy. Without the default, there could be no 
forced place policy to be had under the terms of the trust deed. If no loss had 
occurred, Borrowers would likely be contesting being forced to pay for an 
unnecessary insurance policy. The Cigna Policy, therefore, had to be canceled 
effective as of the effective date of the Phoenix Indemnity Policy, which 
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cancellation was further evidenced by the full refund of the entire premium 
advanced by Lee Servicing. 
Borrowers claim that there were unresolved issues of material fact to 
prohibit the trial court from granting summary judgment. These unresolved 
issues of material fact seem to relate to the dispute over the terms of the policy 
itself as to whether the policy was one of excess coverage. Such issues have no 
bearing on the trial court's ruling since the trial court did not reach that issue, 
finding instead that the policy had been canceled. Any dispute over the terms of 
coverage of the policy is, therefore, not relevant. Further, whether the Cigna 
Policy contained terms that would allow for excess coverage is not relevant since 
the Cigna Policy could not be maintained as a matter of law in the absence of the 
default as a triggering effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Appellee, Lee Servicing Company, 
hereby respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment. 
DATED this _/jf day of October, 1999. 
LUNDBERG $ ASSOCIATES 
By: (iQc// ^^cf^oz 
y Juc^jJor^ensen 
^^^ttbrfTeys fofAppellee 
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I hereby certify that on this j£_ day of October, 1999,1 mailed two (2) 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to: 
David K. Smith 
Attorney at Law 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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ADDENDUM 
73 REAL ESTATE 57-1-21 
57*1*11. Claimant out of possess ion may convey. 
^Any person claiming title to any real estate may, notwith-
ftati<Hng there may be an adverse possession thereof, sell and 
G**Vey his interest therein in the same manner and with the 
••*&e effect as if he were in the actual possession thereof. 
^•1*12. Form of warranty deed — Effect. 
Con v e Vances of land may be substantially in the following 
fan**; 
WARRANTY DEED 
(insert place 
to 
(here insert name), grantor, of 
Of residence), hereby conveys and warrants 
(insert name), grantee, of (insert place of residence), 
for the sum of dollars, the following described tract 
of land in County, Utah, to wit: (here describe 
the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of 
. ,19 
. *Hich deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
• " ^ t of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs 
*** assigns, of the premises therein named, together with all 
"Appur t enances , rights and privileges thereunto belonging, 
y^H* covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal 
P^^sentat ives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; 
J J ^ h e has good right to convey the same; that he guarantees 
maturity, rate of interest, by and to whom payable and 
Vvhere). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
On said premises, and the sum of dollars attorneys' 
fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this day of 
> , 19 
mortgage when executed as required by law shall have 
"*
e
 effect of a conveyance of the land therein described, 
f a t h e r with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances 
t n e r ^ u n t o beicmgmg^ to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and 
legal representatives, as security for the payment of the 
i n d
^htedness thereon set forth, with covenants from the 
m o r % a g o r of general warranty of title, and that all taxes and 
<* s s^sments levied and assessed upon the land described, 
J^g the continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous 
^ day appointed for the sale of such lands for taxes; and 
m a
^ be foreclosed as provided by law upon any default being 
m a c
*$ in any of the conditions thereof as to payment of either 
P n r ^ ipa l , i n ^ e r e s ^ taxes or assessments. 1953 
57-1, 15. Effect of recording a s s i g n m e n t of m o r t g a g e . 
^e recording of an assignment of a mortgage is not in itself 
cons*dered
 n o t j c e 0f ^ e assignment to the mortgagor, his 
n e i I \ or personal representatives so as to invalidate any 
Pavt*tent made by them or either of them to the mortgagee. 
1988 
fee grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession 57- l s jg to 57-1-18. 
J ^ o f , that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and 
* y the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives will 
$t*)er warrant aa<f<fe&a<ftfie ti'tfe tfiereafih tfiegrantee, A/s 
y 3 ^ and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any 
R a t i o n s to such covenants may be briefly inserted in such 
J P * following the description of the land. 
1988, 1994 
1953 
E ? s 1 3 . Form of quitclaim deed — 
"* tveyances of land may also be fife g form: 
Effect. 
substantially in the 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
. (here insert name), grantor, of. .
 w (insert 
blace of residence), hereby quitclaims to (insert 
tame), grantee, of (here insert place of resi-
lience), for the sum of dollars, the following de-
scribed tract of land in County, Utah, to 
day of 
Vit (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this 
deed when executed as required by law shall have the 
S ^ o f a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of 
jrantor in and to the premises therein described and all 
I A8* privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at 
/Hate of such conveyance. 1953 
,
 N14. Form of mortgage — Effect. 
Mortgage of land may be substantially in the following 
MORTGAGE 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of 
rt place of residence), hereby mortgages to . 
Repealed. 
2**19. Trust d e e d s — Def in i t ions of terms. 
^ used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise 
designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit 
^ trust deed is given, or his successor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property 
V a trust deed as security for the performance of an 
Obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity 
V t h Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real 
Property to a trustee in t rust to secure the performance of 
^n obligation of the trustor or other person named in the 
^eed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real 
property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in 
^ te res t . 
. (5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth 
**l Section 57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed 
V the trust deed. 1988 
57
"
1%$0. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes 
- Effect. 
^nsfers in trust of real property may be made to secure 
e
 *Wformance of an obligation of the trustor or any other 
persQn named in the trust deed to a beneficiary. All right, title, inter 
trust. 
jHisert name), mortgagee, of 
Jttidence), for the sum of 
/ sc r ibed tract of land i n . 
TO* describe the premises). 
(insert place of 
dollars, the following 
_ County, Utah, to wit: 
^st and claim in and to the trust property acquired by the 
c
^r, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the execu-
o&a ^f^he trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for 
°Sligation or obligations for which the trust property is 
c o n v e y e d in like manner as if acquired before execution of the 
t r u s t ( i e e d . 1961 
5 7 - 1 - ^ 
(1) 
Th 
Vlness 
is mortgage is given to secure the following indebt 
(here state amount and form of indebtedness, 
Trustees of trust d e e d s — Qualifications. 
(a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 
7-1-103, or insurance company authorized to do busi-
ness in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United 
States; 
57-1-22 REAL ESTATE 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust 
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
United States; 
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company autho-
rized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation which is li-
censed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm Credit 
Administration or its successor, 
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a 
trust deed existing prior to the effective date of this 
chapter, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to 
that trust deed. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of 
the trust deed, unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a 
trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), (v), or (vi). 1996 
57-1-22. Successor trustees — Appointment by benefi-
ciary — Effect — Substitution of trustee — 
Recording — Form. 
(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any 
time by filing for record in the office of the county recorder of 
each county in which the t rust property or some part thereof 
is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the 
substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to 
all the power, duties, authority, and title of the trustee named 
in the deed of t rust and of any successor trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall: 
(a) identify the trust deed by stating the names of the 
original parties thereto, the date of recordation, and the 
book and page where the same is recorded or the entry 
number; 
(b) include the legal description of the trust property; 
(c) state the name of the new trustee; and 
(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the benefi-
ciaries under the trust deed or their successors in inter-
est. 
(3) If not previously recorded, at the time of recording the 
notice of default, the successor trustee shall file for record the 
substitution of trustee, and a copy thereof shall be sent in the 
manner provided in Section 57-1-26 to all persons to whom a 
copy of the notice of default would be required to be mailed by 
Section 57-1-26. In addition thereto, a copy shall be sent to the 
prior trustee by regular mail to his last-known address. 
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be sufficient if made in 
substantially the following form: 
Substitution of Trustee 
(insert name and address of new trustee) 
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust deed 
executed by as trustor, in which is named benefi-
ciary and as trustee, and filed for record , 19 , 
and recorded in Book , Page , Records of County, 
(or filed for record , 19 , with recorder's entry No. 
, County), Utah. 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment) 
1989 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property — Power of trustee — 
Foreclosure of trust deed. 
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the trustee which 
the trustee may exercise and under which the trust property 
may be sold in the manner hereinafter provided, after a 
breach of an obligation for which the trust property is con-
veyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust 
deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for
 t 
foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of
 Sv. 
ma}'' be exercised by the trustee without express provi^ 
therefor in the trust deed. ic, 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice 
default . 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not 
exercised until: 
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of t 
recorder of each county where the trust property or so; 
part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of defau 
identifying the trust deed by stating the name of t 
trustor named therein and giving the book and pa 
where the trust deed is recorded and a legal description 
the trust property, and containing a statement that 
breach of an obligation for which the trust property w, 
conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth t: 
nature of that breach and of his election to sell or cause 
be sold the property to satisfy the obligation; 
(2) not less than three months has thereafter elapse 
and 
(3) after the lapse of at least three months the trust, 
shall give notice of sale as provided in this act. 19^  
57-1 -25. Not i ce of trustee's sa le — Description of proj 
erty — Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time an 
place of sale particularly describing the property to be sold: 
(a) by publication of such notice, at least three time 
once a week for three consecutive weeks, the last publ 
cation to be at least ten days but not more than 30 da^ 
prior to the sale, in some newspaper having a genera 
circulation in each county in which the property to be sole 
or some part thereof, is situated; and 
(b) by posting such notice, at least 20 days before th 
date of sale, in some conspicuous place on the property t 
be sold and also in at least three public places of each cit 
or county in which the property to be sold, or some pa^ 
thereof, is situated. 
(2) The sale shall be held at the time and place designate 
in the notice of sale which shall be between the hours of 9 a.n. 
and 5 p.m. and at the courthouse of the county in which th 
property to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated. 
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in substai 
tially the following form: 
Notice of Trustee's Sale 
The following described property will be sold at publi 
auction to the highest bidder, payable in lawful money of th 
United States at the time of sale, at the in , __ 
County, Utah, on , 19 , at m. of said day, for th 
purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by am 
, his wife, as trustors, in favor of , covering re;. 
property located at , and more particularly described a.\ 
(Insert legal description) 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment, if recorded) 
Dated , 19 
Trustee 
198 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default anc 
not ice of sale — Mailing by trustee or benefl 
ciary — Publ icat ion of not ice of default. 
(1) (a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of defaul 
and of any notice of sale under any trust deed may, at an: 
time subsequent to the filing for record of the trust dee( 
«£NL^&ra 5M-2& 
prior to the filing for record of a notice of default 
oder, file for record in the office of the county 
ier of any county in which any part or parcel of the 
; property is situated, a duly acknowledged request 
r a copy of any such notice of default and notice of sale. 
^request shall set forth the name and address of the 
_j or persons requesting copies of such notices and 
! identify the trust deed by stating the names of the 
ignginal parties thereto, the date of filing for record 
of, the book and page where the same is recorded or 
• recorder's entry number, and the legal description of 
v trust property. The request shall be in substantially 
f the following form: 
REQUEST FOR NOTICE 
L^ Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of 
\ default and a copy of notice of sale under the trust deed 
t filed for record , 19 , and recorded in Book , 
Page , Records of County, (or filed for record 
19 , with recorder's entry number , 
nty), Utah, executed by as trustor, in which 
. is named as beneficiary and as trustee, be 
id to (insert name) at (insert 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature 
(Certificate of Acknowledgement) 
(b) Upon filing for record of such request, the recorder 
|T*haIl index such request in the mortgagor's index, mort-
^gagee's index, and abstract record. Except as provided in 
:ithis section the trustee under any such deed of trust is not 
. to send notice of default or notice of sale to any 
on not filing a request for notice as described herein. 
Not later than ten days after recordation of such notice 
#f default, the trustee or beneficiary shall mail, by certified or 
ItflsteTed mail, with postage prepaid, a copy of such notice 
g i t h i h e recording date shown thereon, addressed to each 
|B|ioii:whose name and address are set forth in a request 
| t e e f o r which has been recorded prior to the filing for record 
pTthenotice of default, directed to the address designated in 
WfWjuest. At least 20 days before the date of sale, the trustee 
m i l mail, by certified or registered mail, with postage pre-
ff4* copy of the notice of the time and place of sale, 
JWrased to each person whose name and address are set 
P ^ h m a request therefor which has been recorded prior to 
g g f f i n g for record of the notice of default, directed to the 
gaaress designated in the request. 
gJgj^Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any 
JW^e of default and a copy of any notice of sale thereunder be 
Mffl»~ to any Pe rson a party thereto at the address of such 
# • * * » set forth therein, and a copy of any notice of default and 
S m i ^ l ? 0 t i c e o f s a l e s h a U be mailed to each such person at the 
w*sae time and in the same manner required as though a 
2£«rate request therefor had been filed by each of such 
F***»ig as provided in this section. 
« ) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed 
g u a n o request for notice by such trustor has been recorded 
C P P ° M - t * i n t h i s s e c t i o n > a c°Py o f t h e n o t i c e of default shall 
|jlrIKwushed at least three times, once a week for three 
^Mecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in 
£ 2 * 1 ° ° ? ^ m W h i ° h t h e t r u s t P r °P e r t y ' o r s o m e P a r t thereof, 
^ ^ w a t e d , such publication to commence not later than ten 
I7«irk r u fiHng f o r r e c o r d o f t h e n o t i c e of default. In lieu 
^ ^ p u b l i c a t i o n , a copy of the notice of default may be 
• " " w e d personally to the trustor within the ten days or at 
™
 a m e b e f o r e publication is completed. 
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record 
pursuant to this section, nor any statement or allegation in 
3 ny such request, nor any record thereof, shall affect the title 
to trust property or be deemed notice to any person that any 
person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale 
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim 
^pon, the trust property. 1989 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by public auct ion — 
Postponement of sale. 
(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the 
notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall 
sell the property at public auction to the highest bidder. The 
tfustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may conduct the sale 
a n d act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which 
tJie trust property shall be sold, if the property consists of 
several known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage 
separately. The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall follow 
these directions. Any person, including the beneficiary or 
trustee, may bid at the sale. Each bid is considered an 
^revocable offer, and if the purchaser refuses to pay the 
a mount bid by him for the property sold to him at the sale, the 
trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again sell the 
property at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing 
XO pay 'iVie \nu price is Via^ tJie for any \DSB ottasitmeu Vy Y^ifc 
refusal, including interest, costs, and trustee's and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. The trustee or the attorney for the trustee may 
^hereafter reject any other bid of that person. 
(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he 
considers expedient, postpone the sale up to a period not to 
exceed 72 hours. If the last hour of the postponement falls on 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the sale may be 
postponed until the same hour of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. The person conducting 
the sale shall give notice of the postponement by public 
declaration at the time and place last appointed for the sale, 
pfo other notice of the postponed sale is required, unless the 
sale is postponed for longer than 72 hours beyond the date 
designated in the notice of sale. In the event of a longer 
postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and renoticed in the 
5ame manner as the original notice of sale is required to be 
^ iven . 1988 
#7-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment 
of bid — Trustee's deed del ivered to pur-
chaser — Recitals — Effect. 
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as 
directed by the trustee and upon receipt of payment, the 
trustee shall execute and deliver his deed to such purchaser. 
Tfhe trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance with the 
requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to 
\J&ft. ^xfixasa. Q& t&&, ^RW^X o& saifc. 3^&d. ^ aia. o& tJaa. ^ o ^ x t ^ 
described therein, including recitals concerning any mailing, 
personal delivery, and publication of the notice of default, any 
j a i l i n g and the publication and posting of the notice of sale, 
#nd the conduct of sale. These recitals constitute prima facie 
evidence of such compliance and are conclusive evidence in 
favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value 
^nd without notice. 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the pur-
chaser, without right of redemption, the trustee's title and all 
fight, title, interest, and claim of the trustor and his succes-
sors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or 
under them, in and to the property sold, including all such 
fight, title, interest, and claim in and to such property 
acquired by the trustor or his successors in interest subse-
quent to the execution of the trust deed. 1985 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Disposit ion. 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, 
first, to the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale 
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and of the sale, including the payment of the trustee's and 
attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount 
which may be provided for in the trust deed, second, to 
payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed, and the 
balance, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled to the 
proceeds, or the trustee, in his discretion, may deposit the 
balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district court of 
the county in which the sale took place. Upon depositing the 
balance, the trustee shall be discharged from all further 
responsibility and the clerk shall deposit the proceeds with the 
state treasurer subject to the order of the district court. 1997 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate 
stock evidencing water r ights g iven to secure 
trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used, 
intended to be used, or suitable for use on the trust property 
and which are hypothecated to secure an obligation secured by 
a trust deed may be sold with the trust property, or any part 
thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided in this 
act. 1961 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obli-
gat ions secured — Reinstatement — Cancel-
lat ion of recorded not ice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any 
obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity 
date fixed in such obligation, become due or been declared due 
by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any 
obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the 
payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or by 
reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the 
terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for 
insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in accordance 
with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the trustor 
or his successor in interest in the t rus t property or any part 
thereof or any other person having a subordinate lien or 
encumbrance of record thereon or any beneficiary under a 
subordinate t rust deed, at any time within three months of the 
filing for record of notice of default under such trust deed, if 
the power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary 
or his successor in interest the entire amount then due under 
the terms of such trust deed (including costs and expenses 
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation, or 
trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually 
incurred) other than such portion of the principal as would not 
then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the 
default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all proceedings 
theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontin-
ued and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and 
shall be and remain in force and effect the same as if no such 
acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the t rus t deed reinstated in 
Jhe manner provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his 
assignee, shall, on demand of any person having an interest in 
the trust property, execute and deliver to him a request to the 
trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of 
the recorded notice of default under such trust deed; and any 
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a 
period of 30 days after such demand, refuses to request the 
trustee to execute and deliver such cancellation is liable to the 
person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from 
such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee 
or beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustee's deed 
constitutes a cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a 
cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a t rust deed 
is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is suffi-
cient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially the 
following form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed 
for record , 19 , and recorded in Book , Page _^ 
Records of County, (or filed of record , 19—, with 
recorder's entry No , County), Utah, which notice of 
default refers to the trust deed executed by as trustor, in 
which is named as beneficiary and as trustee, and 
filed for record , 19 , and recorded in Book , Page
 t 
Records of County, (or filed of record , 19 , v^th 
recorder's entry No. , County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
1985 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for 
which trust deed w a s g iven as security — 
Collection of costs and attorney's fees . 
At any time within three months after any sale of property 
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action ma3r be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action 
the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebt-
edness which was secured by such t rus t deed, the amount for 
which such property was sold, and the fair market value 
thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the 
property sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's 
and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under 
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an 
action under this section. 1985 
57-1-33. Repealed. 1994 
57-1-33.1. Reconveyance of a trust deed. 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a t rust deed has been 
satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by the 
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
(b) At the time the beneficiary requests a reconveyance 
under Subsection (l)(a), the beneficiary shall deliver to 
the trustee or the trustee's successor in interest the trust 
deed and the note or other evidence that the obligation 
securing the trust deed has been satisfied. 
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate 
the grantee as "the person or persons entitled thereto." 1995 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — Foreclo-
sure of trust deed — Limitat ion of act ions . 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be 
made, or an action to foreclose a t rust deed as provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be 
commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the 
trust deed. 1&61 
57-1-35. Trust deeds — Transfer of secured debts as 
transfer of security. 
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall 
operate as a transfer of the security therefor. 1961 
57-1-3(5. Trust deeds — Instruments entit led to be re-
corded — Assignment of a beneficial interest . 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a 
beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of default, 
trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust property, and any 
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nt by which any trust deed is subordinated or waived 
i w o r i t y , if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to 
1
 rded. The recording of an assignment of a beneficial 
t in the trust deed does not in itself impart notice of the 
at to the trustor, his heirs or personal representa-
_LfiO as to invalidate any payment made by any of them to 
^•MTion holding the note, bond, or other instrument evi-
l l j l i i n g t h e obligation by the trust deed. 1988 
'j^JSW-* Failure to disclose not a basis for liability. 
- jStO ^ e ^ a^u r e °f a n o w n e r °f r e a l property to disclose that 
j jy^goper tv being offered for sale is stigmatized is not a 
material fact that must be disclosed in the transaction of real 
property. 
SfJDJNeither an owner nor his agent is liable for failing to 
Jjickee that the property is stigmatized. 1991 
A-l- t t . . Release of security interest. 
C0*As"used in this section: 
(a) "Secured lender" means: 
(i) a mortgagee on a mortgage; 
(ii) a beneficiary on a trust deed; 
(iii) a person that holds or retains legal title to real 
property as security for financing the purchase of the 
^real property under a real estate sales contract; and 
(iv) any other person that holds or retains a secu-
rity interest in real property to secure the repayment 
of a secured loan. 
(b) (i) "Secured loan" means a loan or extension of 
credit, the repayment of which is secured by a mort-
gage, a trust deed, the holding or retention of legal 
title under a real estate sales contract, or other 
security interest in real property, whether or not the 
security interest is perfected. 
(ii) A judgment award secured by a judgment lien 
is not of itself a secured loan. A subsequent written 
agreement between a judgment creditor and a judg-
ment debtor concerning payment of the judgment is a 
secured loan if it otherwise qualifies under the defi-
nition in Subsection (l)(b)(i). 
(c) "Security interest" means an interest in real prop-
erty that secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion. Security interest includes a lien or encumbrance. 
' Cd) "Servicer" means a person that services and re-
ceives loan payments on behalf of a secured lender with 
respect to a secured loan. 
* <2) This section may not be interpreted to validate, invali-
date, alter, or otherwise affect the foreclosure of a mortgage, 
ibeexercise of a trustee's power of sale, the exercise of a 
teller's right of reentry under a real estate sales contract, or 
w e exercise of any other power or remedy of a secured lender 
to•enforce the repayment of a secured loan. 
{&}'A secured (ender or servicer who fails to release the 
•ecunty interest on a secured loan within 90 days after receipt 
Cf the final payment of the loan is liable to another secured 
•eo^er on the real property or the owner or titleholder of the 
real property for: 
# (a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages 
incurred because of the failure to release the security 
interest, including all expenses incurred in completing a 
quiet title action; and 
- *
 r e a s o n a b * e attorneys' fees and court costs. 
iv*? /«*\ . s e c u r e d lender or servicer is not liable under Subsec-
«on (3) if the secured lender or servicer: 
va) has established a reasonable procedure to release 
the security interest on a secured loan in a timely manner 
after the final payment on the loan; 
-(b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and 
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 
days after receipt of the final payment because of the 
action or inaction of an agency or other person beyond its 
direct control.
 1995 
57-1-39. Def ini t ions . 
As used in Sections 57-1-40 and 57-1-44: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the record owner of the benefi-
ciary's interest under a trust deed, including successors in 
interest. 
(2) "Mortgage" is as described in Section 57-1-14. 
(3) "Mortgagee" means the record owner of the mort-
gagee's interest under a mortgage, including a successor 
in interest. 
(4) "Satisfactory evidence of the full payment of the 
obligation secured by a trust deed or mortgage" means the 
original cancelled check or a copy of a check, including a 
voucher copy, payable to the beneficiary or a servicer, and 
reasonable documentary evidence that the check was 
intended to effect full payment under the trust deed or an 
encumbrance upon the property covered by the trust deed. 
(5) "Servicer" means a person or entity that collects 
loan payments on behalf of a beneficiary or mortgagee. 
(6) 'Title agent" means a title insurance agent licensed 
as an organization under Title 31A, Chapter 23, Part II, 
Licensing of Agents, Brokers and Consultants. 
(7) "Title insurer" means a title insurer authorized to 
conduct business in the state under Title 31A, Chapter 23, 
Fart //, Licensing of Agents, Brokers and Consultants. 
(8) "Trust deed" is as defined in Subsection 57-1-19(3). 
1995 
57-1-40. Reconveyance of trust deed or release of 
mortgage — Procedures — Forms. 
(1) A title insurer or title agent may reconvey a trust deed 
or release a mortgage in accordance with the provisions of 
Subsections (2) through (6) if: 
(a) the obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage 
has been fully paid by the title insurer or title agent; or 
(b) the title insurer or title agent possesses satisfactory 
evidence of the full payment of the obligation secured by a 
trust deed or mortgage. 
(2) A title insurer or title agent may reconvey a trust deed 
or release a mortgage under Subsection (1) regardless of 
Whether the title insurer or title agent is named as a trustee 
Under a trust deed or has the authority to release a mortgage. 
(3) No sooner than 30 days after payment in full of the 
obligation secured by a trust deed or mortgage, the title 
insurer or title agent shall deliver to the beneficiary, mort-
gagee, or servicer, or send by certified mail to the beneficiary, 
mortgagee, or servicer at the address specified in the trust 
deed or mortgage, at any address for the beneficiary or 
mortgagee specified in the last recorded assignment of the 
trust deed or mortgage, and at any address for the beneficiary, 
mortgagee, or servicer specified in a request for notice re-
corded under Section 57-1-26, a notice of intent to release or 
Veconvey and a copy of the release or reconveyance to be 
Recorded as provided in Sections (4) and (5). 
(4) The notice of intent to release or reconvey shall contain 
*;he name of the beneficiary or mortgagee and the servicer if 
loan payments on the trust deed or mortgage are collected by 
h servicer, the name of the title insurer or title agent, the date, 
^nd be substantially in the following form: 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELEASE OR RECONVEY 
Notice is hereby given to you as follows: 
1. This notice concerns the (trust deed or mortgage) 
described as follows: 
(Trustor or Mortgagor): 
(Beneficiary or Mortgagee): 
Recording information: 
Entry Number: 
Book Number: 
Page Number: 
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2. The undersigned claims to have paid in full or 
possesses satisfactory evidence of the full payment of the 
obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage de-
scribed above. 
3. The undersigned will fully release the mortgage or 
reconvey the trust deed described in this notice unless, 
within 60 days from the date stated on this notice, the 
undersigned has received by certified mail a notice stating 
that the obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage 
has not been paid in full or that you otherwise object to 
the release of the mortgage or the reconveyance of the 
trust deed. Notice shall be mailed to the address stated on 
this form. 
4. A copy of the (release of mortgage or reconveyance of 
trust deed) is enclosed with this notice. 
(Signature of title insurer or title agent) 
(Address of title insurer or title agent) 
(5) (a) If, within 60 days from the day on which the title 
insurer or title agent delivered or mailed the notice of 
intent to release or reconvey in accordance with Subsec-
tions (3) and (4), the beneficiary, mortgagee, or servicer 
does not send by certified mail to the title insurer or title 
agent a notice that the obligation secured by the t rust 
deed or mortgage has not been paid in full or that the 
beneficiary, mortgagee, or servicer objects to the release of 
the mortgage or reconveyance of the trust deed, the title 
insurer or title agent may execute, acknowledge, and 
record a reconveyance of a trust deed or release of a 
mortgage. 
(b) A reconveyance of a trust deed under Subsection 
(5)(a) shall be in substantially the following form: 
RECONVEYANCE OF TRUST DEED 
(Name of title insurer or title agent), a (title insurer or 
title agent) authorized to conduct business in the state 
does hereby reconvey, without warranty, the following 
trust property located in (name of county) County, state of 
Utah, that is covered by a trust deed naming (name of 
trustor) as trustor, and (name of beneficiary) as benefi-
ciary and was recorded on (date) in Book at Page 
as Entry Number (insert a description of the 
trust property.) 
The undersigned title insurer or title agent certifies as 
follows: 
1. The undersigned title insurer or title agent has 
fully paid the obligation secured by the trust deed or 
possesses satisfactory evidence of the full payment of 
the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
2. No sooner than 30 days after payment in full of 
the obligation secured by the trust deed, the title 
insurer or title agent delivered or sent by certified 
mail to the beneficiary or servicer at the address 
specified in the trust deed, at any address for the 
beneficiary specified in the last recorded assignment 
of the trust deed, and at any address for the benefi-
ciary or servicer specified in a request for notice 
recorded under Section 57-1-26, a notice of intent to 
release or reconvey and a copy of the reconveyance. 
3. The title insurer or title agent did not receive, 
within 60 days from the day on which the title insurer 
or title agent delivered or mailed the notice of intent 
to release or reconvey, a notice from the beneficiary or 
servicer sent by certified mail that the obligation 
secured by the trust deed has not been paid in full or 
that the beneficiary or servicer objects to the recon-
veyance of the trust deed. 
(Signature of title insurer or title agent; 
(c) A release of a mortgage under Subsection (5)(a 
shall be in substantially the following form: 
RELEASE OF MORTGAGE 
(Name of title insurer or title agent), a (title insurer c: 
title agent) authorized to conduct business in the star. 
does hereby release the mortgage on the following prop 
erty located in (name of county) County, state of Utah 
that is covered by a mortgage naming (name of inon 
gagor) as mortgagor, and (name of mortgagee) as mon 
gagee and was recorded on (date) in Book at Pag 
as Entry Number (insert a description of th, 
t rust property.) 
The undersigned title insurer or title agent certifies a> 
follows: 
1. The undersigned title insurer or title agent ha.* 
fully paid the obligation secured by the mortgage or 
possesses satisfactory evidence of the full payment o: 
the obligation secured by the mortgage. 
2. No sooner than 30 days after payment in full o: 
the obligation secured by the mortgage, the title 
insurer or title agent delivered to the mortgagee or 
sent by certified mail to the mortgagee or servicer at 
the address specified in the mortgage and at any 
address for the mortgagee specified in the last re-
corded assignment of the mortgage, a notice of intent 
to release or reconvey and a copy of the release. 
3. The title insurer or title agent did not receive. 
within 60 days from the day on which the title insurer 
or title agent delivered or mailed the notice of intent 
to release or reconvey, a notice from the mortgagee or 
servicer sent by certified mail that the obligation 
secured by the mortgage has not been paid in full or 
that the mortgagee or servicer objects to the release 
of the mortgage. 
(Notarization) 
(Notarization) 
(Signature of title insurer or title agent) 
(d) (i) A release of mortgage or reconveyance of trust 
deed that is executed and notarized in accordance 
with Subsections (5)(b) or (c) is entitled to recorda-
tion, 
(ii) (A) Except as provided in Subsection 
(5)(d)(ii)(B), a reconveyance of a t rust deed or 
release of a mortgage that is recorded under 
Subsection (5)(dXi) is valid regardless of any 
deficiency in the release or reconveyance proce-
dure not disclosed in the release of mortgage or 
reconveyance of trust deed. 
(B) If the title insurer's or title agent's signa-
ture on a release of mortgage or reconveyance oi 
trust deed recorded under Subsection (SXdXiiXA1 
is forged, the release of mortgage or reconvey-
ance of t rust deed is void. 
(6) A release of mortgage or reconveyance of t rust deed 
under this section does not discharge an obligation that was 
secured by the trust deed or mortgage at the time the trust 
deed was reconveyed or the mortgage was released. 1995 
57-1-41. Objections to reconveyance or release . 
A title insurer or title agent may not record a reconveyance 
of trust deed or release of mortgage if, within 60 days from the 
day on which the title insurer or title agent delivered or 
mailed the notice of intent to release or reconvey in accordance 
REAL ESTATE 57-2-17 
57-1-40(3) and (4), the beneficiary, mort-
raends a notice that the obligation secured by 
_r mortgage has not been paid in full or objects 
Mif the mortgage or reconveyance of the t rust 
i o n (5)(a). 1995 
Bty of title insurer or title agent. 
. or title agent purporting to act under the 
f Section 57-1-40 who reconveys a trust deed or 
«age is liable to the beneficiary or mortgagee 
„ j suffered as a result of the reconveyance if: 
e obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage 
i fully paid; and 
, _ » t i t l e insurer or title agent failed to comply 
I the provisions of Sections 57-1-40 and 57-1-41; 
b) the title insurer or title agent acted with gross 
or in bad faith in reconveying the trust 
1995 
lication of provisions. 
_ia of Sections 57-1-39 through 57-1-42 apply to 
rsecured by a trust deed or mortgage that was 
" , or after May 1,1995. 1995 
er sections not affected. 
-1-39 through 57-1-43 do not excuse a benefi-
trustee, secured lender, or servicer from 
I the provisions of Section 57-1-38. 1995 
m* CHAPTER 2 
6 V : ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
J££9- itepealed. 
:**j£proof of execution — How made. 
^Witness must be known or identified. 
aCertificate of proof by subscribing witness. 
Form for certificate of proof. 
Proof of handwriting. 
Evidence required for certificate of proof. 
Subpoena to subscribing witness. 
Disobedience of subpoenaed witness — Con-
» tempt — Proof aliunde. 
Repealed. 1988 
•f of execut ion — How made. 
0* t ° e execution of any conveyance whereby real 
conveyed or may be affected shall be: 
v% thfc testimony of a subscribing witness, if there is 
y * ^ 1 1 *U the subscribing witnesses are dead, or 
* J J * **<*. by evidence of the handwriting of the 
# * # l 2 i i 0 f a s u b s c r i b i n g witness, if there is one, given 
f&S***™* witness to each signature. 1953 
^ * * ^ _ W i t n e 8 8 must be known or identified. 
jSjW^fby a subscribing witness shall be taken unless such 
ahall be personally known to the officer taking the 
— ^ j ^ P f f the person whose name is subscribed to the 
WlfiFSl*8 a W l t T l e s s t h ere to , or shall be proved to be such 
' • W S W w A 1 ' ^ 5 r m a t i o n o f a credible witness Dersonallv a credible itness personally 
1953 
$ l W W t i « • t e o f P r o o f ° y s u b s c r i b i n g wi tness . 
l i E f S ? ? ™ ^ of such proof shall be made unless such 
Witness shall prove that the person whose name is 
thereto as a party is the person described in, and 
the same; that such person executed the 
veyance, and that such person subscribed his name thereto as 
a witness thereof at the request of the maker of such instru-
ment. 1953 
57-2-13. Form for certificate of proof. 
The certificate of such proof shall be substantially in the 
following form, to wit: 
State of Utah, County of 
On this day of , 19 , before me personally 
appeared , personally known to me (or satisfactorily 
proved to me by the oath of , a competent and credible 
witness for that purpose, by me duly sworn) to be the same 
person whose name is subscribed to the above instrument as a 
witness thereto, who, being by me duly sworn, deposed and 
said that he resides in , county of , and state of 
Utah; that he was present and saw , personally known to 
him to be the signer of the above instrument as a party 
thereto, sign and deliver the same, and heard him acknowl-
edge that he executed the same, and that he, the deponent, 
thereupon signed his name as a subscribing witness thereto at 
the request of said 1953 
57-2-14. Proof of handwrit ing. 
No proof by evidence of the handwriting of a party, or of the 
subscribing witness or witnesses,, shall he taken unless the 
officer taking the same shall be satisfied that all the subscrib-
ing witnesses to such conveyance are dead, out of the jurisdic-
tion, or cannot be had to prove the execution thereof. 1953 
57-2-15. Evidence required for certificate of proof. 
No certificate of any such proof shall be made unless a 
competent and credible witness shall state on oath or affirma-
tion that he personally knew the person whose name is 
subscribed thereto as a party, well knows his signature, 
stating his means of knowledge, and believes the name of the 
party subscribed thereto as a party was subscribed by such 
person; nor unless a competent and credible witness shall in 
like manner state that he personally knew the person whose 
name is subscribed to such conveyance as a witness, well 
knows his signature, stating his means of knowledge, and 
believes the name subscribed thereto as a witness was thereto 
subscribed by such person. 1953 
57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness . 
Upon the application of any grantee in any conveyance 
required by law to be recorded, or of any person claiming 
under such grantee, verified under the oath of the applicant, 
that any witness to such conveyance residing in the county 
where such application is made refuses to appear and testify 
touching the execution thereof, and that such conveyance 
cannot be proved without his evidence, any officer authorized 
ta take the ackitfyMedgraettt OY pYwtf o? such tt>YweyaY\£e ma^ 
issue a subpoena requiring such witness to appear before such 
officer and testify touching the execution thereof. 1953 
57-2-17. Disobedience of subpoenaed wi tness — Con-
tempt — Proof al iunde. 
Every person who, being served with a subpoena, shall 
without reasonable cause refuse or neglect to appear, or, 
appearing, shall refuse to answer upon oath touching the 
matters aforesaid, shall be liable to the party injured for such 
damages as may be sustained by him on account of such 
neglect or refusal, and may also be dealt with for contempt as 
provided by law; but no person shall be required to attend who 
resides out of the county in which the proof is to be taken, nor 
unless his reasonable expenses shall have first been tendered 
to him; provided, that if it shall appear to the satisfaction of 
the officer so authorized to take such acknowledgment that 
such subscribing witness purposely conceals himself, or keeps 
out of the way, so that he cannot be served with a subpoena or 
taken on attachment after the use of due diligence to that end, 
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45-2-1. Retraction by newspapers — Limit of recovery. 
If it shall appear on the trial of any action brought for the publication of amy 
alleged libel in any newspaper published in this state that the alleged libel was 
published in good faith, that the publication thereof was due to mistake or 
misapprehension of the facts, and that a full and fair retraction of any 
statement therein alleged to be erroneous was published in the same type and 
in the same position on the same page as was the article complained of as 
libelous, in the next regular issue of such newspaper, or in case of a daily paper 
within three days, after service upon the publisher of such newspaper, at the 
principal office of its publication by the party aggrieved, of a written notice 
specifying the statement alleged to be erroneous, or, in case such notice is not 
served in the issue or within the time above specified after the filing of the 
complaint and service of the summons in said action, then the plaintiff shall 
recover only actual damages; provided, that if such libel was published in a 
Sunday edition, the publication of the retraction must have been in a Sunday 
edition within two weeks after the times above specified; provided further, that 
this section shall not apply in the case of any libel against any candidate for a 
public office at any election or primary, or any avowed candidate for nomina-
tion to any office before any political convention, unless the retraction of the 
charge was made editorially in a conspicuous manner at least five days before 
the holding of such election, primary or political convention in case such 
libelous article was published in a daily paper, or if published in a weekly 
paper, at least three days before the holding thereof, which editorial retraction 
shall be in lieu of any other retraction herein provided for. 
45-2-1.5. Actual damages — Broadcast in good faith — 
Retraction — Time — Candidate for public office. 
(1) If it shall appear on the trial of any action brought for any alleged libel 
or slander on any radio or television broadcast originating in this state that the 
alleged libel or slander was broadcast in good faith, the broadcast thereof was 
due to mistake or misapprehension of the facts, and that a full and fair 
retraction of any statement therein alleged to be erroneous was broadcast on 
the same station and approximately the same time of day as was the alleged 
libel or slander, within three days after learning of the mistake or within three 
days after service upon the person broadcasting that libel or slander, by the 
party aggrieved, of a written notice specifying the statement alleged to be 
erroneous or, in case such notice is not served, in the manner and within the 
time above specified after the filing of the complaint and service of the 
summons in said action, then the plaintiff shall recover only actual damages. 
(2) This section shall not apply in the case of any libel or slander against any 
candidate for a public office at any general or primary election, or any Avowed 
candidate for nomination to any office before any political convention, unless 
the retraction of the charge was made in the same manner as provided for 
other retractions under this section within 24 hours of the time the person 
broadcasting that libel or slander became aware of the mistake, but in no case 
later than three days before the holding of such general or primary election or 
political convention. A written text of the retraction shall be made available to 
the candidate immediately after it has been broadcast. This retraction shall be 
in lieu of any other retraction herein provided for. 
45-2-2. Libel and slander defined. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) aLibelw means a malicious defamation, expressed either by printing 
or by signs or pictures or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one 
who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, or 
publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him 
to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. 
(2) "Slander" means any libel communicated by spoken words. 
45-2-3. Privileged publication or broadcast defined. 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be considered as 
libelous or slanderous per se, is one made: 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty. 
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any statement made in any 
legislative or judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding 
authorized by law. 
(3) In a communication,^without malice, to a person interested therein, 
by one who is also interested, or by one who stands in such relation to the 
person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the 
motive for the communication innocent, or who is requested by the person 
interested to give the information. 
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, legislative, or 
other public official proceeding, or of anything said in the course thereof, 
or of a charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon 
which a warrant shall have been issued or an arrest made. 
(5) By a fair and true report, without malice, of the proceedings of a 
public meeting, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful 
purpose and open to the public, or the publication or broadcast of the 
matter complained of was for the public benefit. 
45-2-4. Malice not inferred from publication. 
In the cases provided for in Subsections 45-2-3(3), (4) and (5), malice is not 
inferred from the communication or publication. 
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